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Abstract
Between 1750 and 1830 the Dutch state developed from an oligarchic republic into an
enlightened autocratic monarchy via a brief experiment with representative democracy.
During this period, there was an ongoing debate about the right to petition. Political
actors and opinion-makers addressed the questions to what and to whom this right
extended, and what it meant to have such a right. While theorists of the different types
of government had sharply contrasting views on the place of the people in the political
process, ideas about petitioning, which throughout the period under discussion
remained the principal instrument for popular involvement in politics, stayed remark-
ably stable. Through an investigation of the debate on the right to petition in the crucial
transitional phase from the Dutch Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this
article contributes to bridging the divide between petition research of the early modern
period and that of the modern era.
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Introduction
The historiography on petitioning in Europe has long been subject to geographical
and chronological divisions. Around the year 2000 the Swiss historian Andreas
Wu¨rgler and his Italian colleague Cecilia Nubola published a number of
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groundbreaking edited volumes about various aspects of the phenomenon of peti-
tioning in late medieval and early modern times, mostly in Central Europe.1 Two of
the themes they covered, petitioning as a form of political communication and
petitioning in times of political crisis, were also central to the work of several
historians interested in seventeenth-century England.2 David Zaret, who identiﬁed
innovations in the practice of petitioning as the prime mover of the rise of a public
sphere during the English Revolution, is perhaps best known outside of Great
Britain.3 Zaret’s views have been both thought-provoking and controversial.4
Recently an eﬀort was made to merge the British and continental traditions in
the study of the history of early modern petitioning.5 Brodie Waddell, an English
historian who took the initiative to unite scholars from both traditions, broadened
the agenda of petitioning research even further by suggesting that premodern and
modern petitioning merit more comparison as well.6 A similar call for an inter-
national, comparative history of petitioning from the medieval period to the pre-
sent comes from the side of modernists, most notably Henry Miller and Richard
Huzzey. Their project on petitioning in England during the ‘long nineteenth cen-
tury’ builds on earlier research on petitions to nineteenth-century Parliament.7
Whereas this literature previously made up a historiographical strand of its own,
mostly focusing on speciﬁc campaigns, Miller and Huzzey are more interested in
petitioning ‘as a general phenomenon’.8
It is perhaps no coincidence that recent proposals to remove chronological bar-
riers have come from Great Britain, where the political and societal ruptures
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are deemed less sharp.9 In contin-
ental Europe, particularly in those countries that have gone through an age of
revolution, the institutional divide between early modern and modern history
research is generally stronger. As a result, practices that continued to exist after
1800 have been studied by modernists as if they were entirely diﬀerent phenomena.
This has certainly been the case for petitioning because the revolutionary phase
that links the early modern to the modern has remained surprisingly understu-
died.10 In this contribution I wish to focus on the debate on the right to petition
in the Netherlands during the crucial transitional phase from the Dutch Republic
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The modest body of scholarship on Dutch
petitioning discusses either the Republic or the Kingdom.11 Historians of the early
modern and nineteenth-century Netherlands, following contemporary usage, even
tend to refer to petitions with diﬀerent words – request and petitie respectively.12
In reality, as will become clear, it is possible to identify an ongoing debate about
petitioning before and after 1800, changes in vocabulary and scholarly traditions
notwithstanding.
It has often been observed that in early modern and nineteenth-century Europe
the right to petition was considered a self-evident right.13 If elsewhere in Europe it
was problematic to categorically deny the right to petition, in the early modern
Dutch Republic this would have been virtually impossible, as it would have
amounted to condemning the behavior of the founding fathers of Dutch independ-
ence.14 The boundaries of the early modern Dutch debate on the right to petition
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were delineated by the idea that the Dutch quest for independence from the
Spanish empire had started with the Petition of Compromise, a petition against
the Inquisition presented in Brussels by some two hundred Dutch nobles to
Margaret of Parma, governor of the Netherlands on behalf of Philip II, in 1566.
The central place attributed to petitioning in the foundational story of the Dutch
Republic did not prevent the development of a debate about the nature and scope
of the right to petition between the mid-eighteenth century, when the Dutch
Republic was shaken by political upheaval following a French invasion, and the
year 1830, when a revolt in the Belgian provinces eﬀectively ended the United
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Whereas most historical scholarship on petitioning
starts from the assumption that the right to petition was unquestioned, a more
detailed look at the Dutch debate shows that below the surface of the common
acceptance, to at least some degree, of a right to petition, political actors and
opinion-makers greatly diﬀered on the questions regarding to what and to whom
this right extended, and what it meant to have such a right. As well as analyzing the
debate on the right to petition under the diﬀerent regimes in the period under
discussion, I shall show that while the Dutch state adopted in this period diﬀerent
types of government whose theorists had sharply contrasting views on the place of
the people in the political process, there were signiﬁcant continuities of opinion
over time with regard to the right to petition.
Views on the Right to Petition from the Dutch Republic
to the Kingdom
In the early 1780s a period of conﬂict began in the Dutch Republic, which is known
in Dutch historiography as the Patriot Era (Patriottentijd). Reformist citizens who
referred to themselves as ‘Patriots’ challenged the ruling oligarchic coalition of the
quasi-monarchic stadtholder, William V of Orange, and a limited number of
families that supplied the ‘regents’ or patrician rulers. The Patriot movement was
diverse and consisted both of patricians without access to government positions
and ordinary citizens. The Patriot project started oﬀ as a political campaign to
address abuses within the system but evolved into an attack on the oligarchy itself.
From the outset of the conﬂict, petitions were the principal instruments.
There had been previous peaks of petitioning in the Dutch Republic, most notably
around the political crises of 1672 and 1747–1748, but the Patriots made use of the
instrument on an unprecedented scale.15 A ﬁrst Patriot petition was circulated in
cities throughout the republic and presented to diﬀerent levels of government in the
spring of 1782. The petitioners attempted to intervene in the course of the Fourth
Anglo-Dutch War by requesting that a peace treaty with the United States be
negotiated and John Adams be recognized as US envoy.16 In the following years
the Patriots accompanied every step in their political campaign with petition drives:
their requests became bolder as the conﬂict deepened and dealt with numerous
local and supra-local issues including the need for a treaty with France, the
abolition of seigneurial privileges, and the right to form citizen militias.17
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The Patriot petitions often bore the signatures of large proportions of urban
communities. Their Orangist opponents responded with petitions in which they
defended the status quo and expressed their support of the regime.18
The petitioning craze among the Patriots went hand in hand with the mass
production of political periodicals that gave local events nation-wide publicity and
popularized new ideas about popular sovereignty and representative democracy.19
An early example of such a periodical is De Staatsman (1779–1784) by L.T. van
Nassau la Leck, who became a more outspoken advocate of the Patriot project
over the years. Towards the end of 1782 Nassau la Leck formulated his position
on the right to petition in response to the ﬁrst wave of mass petitions. He asserted that
even under the most arbitrary type of power subjects had the right to petition their
sovereign to advance their private interests or those of their country, as the seigneurial
right to grant favors could be exercised only if the sovereign was informed of what his
subjects desired. If this was so, then the people certainly had the right to petition in
the Dutch Republic, where governments claimed a representative status. According to
Nassau la Leck, however, the right to petition was not unlimited: citizens should not
present petitions unless it was strictly necessary; petitions needed to be phrased in the
most humble manner; and they should always be the result of a voluntary act.20
Formulated in the Patriot Era, Nassau La Leck’s view on petitioning echoes
ideas that had been common among Dutch elites throughout the history of the
Dutch Republic. This is certainly true of his distinction between petitioning about
private interests and petitioning about matters of state or government, public
aﬀairs or aﬀairs with regard to the general interest, as contemporaries variously
called the category that we would label public or political petitioning.21 While there
was little fundamental discussion about the right to present private petitions
(request for jobs, ﬁnancial support etc.), the politicization of the instrument of
petitioning during the 1780s gave rise to a debate about the legitimacy and
desirability of petitions with the goal of inﬂuencing the political process.
The diﬀerent camps in this debate were not neatly divided along Patriot and
Orangist lines. Nassau la Leck’s view that both private and political petitioning
should in principle be permitted was shared, for instance, by Elie Luzac, a member
of a Leiden family of Huguenot origins and a supporter of the oligarchic regime,
who maintained that for a government to advance the general interest it should be
informed of the interests and grievances of its subjects, and there was no better way
to achieve this than through petitions. Writing in 1788, after the Patriot movement
had been suppressed, Luzac criticized the Patriots not for having petitioned but for
having used the petition as a means to exert pressure on authorities.22 He primarily
attacked the manifesto that historians have often seen as the principal confession of
political faith of the Patriot movement. The Leids Ontwerp (Leiden Draft), as this
reform program is usually called, was the collaborative product of representatives
of citizen militias from various cities in the province of Holland, who gathered in
Leiden in 1785.23 Though the Leids Ontwerp was never oﬃcially adopted by the
provincial assembly of citizen militias for which it was intended, it was published
and became one of the most widely read writings of the Patriot Era.24
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The authors of the Leids Ontwerp asserted that under oligarchic rule the right to
petition was the only constitutional instrument available for the people to inﬂuence
their government. Therefore the right should be seen as ‘a way to exercise legisla-
tive power or sovereignty’ and a wide use was to be made of it: the people were to
exert inﬂuence on the deliberative process with bold requests or even, if necessary,
demands.25
Whereas Elie Luzac accused his opponents of violating the convention that
petitioners needed to be humble, others criticized the Patriots on the grounds that
they broke the rule that signing a petition had to be a conscious and voluntary act.
This was, for example, the line of reasoning followed by the States of Gelderland in
a publication that eﬀectively prohibited political petitioning in 1786. This edict was
issued in response to the presenting of petitions signed by several thousands of
citizens from the Quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe at the Diet of the States
of Gelderland the previous year. The petitioners requested a number of drastic
measures, including the revision of the Governmental Regulations of 1750 from
which the stadtholder derived his quasi-monarchic powers.26 The States argued
that most petitioners had not themselves been driven by an illicit desire to
mingle in matters of state but that they had been tricked into signing by duplicitous
individuals. To make it clear that such actions would no longer be tolerated they
placed a ban on soliciting signatures on petitions, and the States would receive only
petitions that were signed by up to six people and bore the signature of a legal
practitioner.27
While there were in the Patriot Era more attempts to restrict the right to
petition, none have had a greater impact on the conﬂict than this publication,
which in Patriot circles was commonly compared to the edicts against heresy in
the sixteenth century. The Patriot-dominated governments of Hattem and Elburg,
two small Veluwe towns, refused to post or enforce the restrictions; the municipal
council of Hattem protested that ‘a free people . . . is gagged and muted by its
representatives . . . to suppress its complaints’.28 The decision of the States of
Gelderland, in the summer of 1786, to ask William V in his capacity as military
commander to call these two rebellious towns to order was to a large extent
inspired by their reluctant attitude on this issue. The attacking and plundering of
Hattem and Elburg by the troops of the stadtholder plunged the country into a
civil war that culminated in an invasion by the army of the Prussian king, the
stadtholder’s brother-in-law, and the defeat of the Patriots in 1787.
In the ﬁrst years of the stadtholderian restoration the Patriots avoided the public
sphere. In the mid-1790s, however, the political balance seemed to tilt again in their
direction. In early 1793 the stadtholder joined the ranks of the counter-revolution-
ary coalition against France, and in the second half of 1794 a French invasion in
the Dutch Republic seemed imminent. Under these circumstances 12 commis-
sioners attempted to present a petition against the stationing of English troops,
signed by 3600 citizens, to the Amsterdam city government. While the commis-
sioners waited to be received by the city’s mayors, a publication against petitioning
was read from the city hall, after which the mayors refused to receive the petition.29
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Four days later, this publication was followed by a publication of the States of
Holland, which is arguably the most far-reaching restriction of the right to petition
in Dutch history. The States banned all petitions that intervened in matters of state
or city administration, which would be taken for ‘illegal impediments to the free
deliberations of the respective governments and violations of the laws of order
and subordination’. They consequently prohibited the writing, printing, copying,
signing and presenting of petitions.30 Six of the commissioners were imprisoned,
and the Patriot revival was suppressed for the time being.
Three months later, in January 1795, the advance of the French army induced the
ﬂight of the stadtholder to England and the collapse of the oligarchic regime. On its
ruins the Patriots, who had started calling themselves Batavians (Bataven) after a
legendary Germanic tribe, founded the Batavian Republic. The Batavians continued
the project, started during the 1780s, of introducing a type of government based on
actual instead of virtual representation: representatives were elected by the people
and served limited terms. Whereas in the Patriot Era this early form of representative
democracy had been envisioned and in some places implemented on the local level,
the Batavians scaled up to the provincial and the national levels. This institutional
transformation was completed in March 1796 with the founding of a National
Assembly, a representative assembly with legislative and constituent powers.31
During its ﬁrst month in session, this assembly issued a publication conﬁrming the
right of every Dutch citizen to petition about state aﬀairs.32 This publication, which
sanctioned a practice that was already in place at the lower levels of government, was
welcomed by Jan Konijnenburg in De Republikein, one of many political periodicals
that were founded in the Batavian Republic. Konijnenburg, an ardent supporter of
the new regime, rejoiced that the liberty of the people was guaranteed by the proc-
lamation of the right to petition, ‘the greatest right of them all in a free society of
citizens’. He considered it the duty of all petitioners to make sure that their petitions
were useful and important so that the people’s representatives were not unnecessarily
disturbed, and that they were worded in appropriate language and with respect for
the sovereignty of the people as it was represented by their elected oﬃcials.33
Konijnenburg’s position on the right to petition was in every respect a return to
the old regime consensus. With the introduction of representative democracy the idea
that petitioning was a way of exercising sovereignty and that petitioners should
therefore claim the right to make demands instead of humble requests was no
longer promoted, at least not in the circles of the new Batavian establishment.
In the years of the Batavian Republic the right to petition was rarely questioned;
the constitution of 1798, the ﬁrst in the history of the Netherlands, conﬁrmed that
each inhabitant could address his governments with petitions.34 Meanwhile, the
system of representative democracy rapidly lost support. Toward the end of the
century, many of its erstwhile supporters had become dissatisﬁed with the ongoing
discord in the parliament and between the diﬀerent powers, which in their eyes
paralyzed the political process and impeded the much-needed implementation of
the constitution. In 1801 these critics staged a coup and introduced a new consti-
tution; the executive was given the exclusive right of initiative; the new Legislative
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Body had only the right to approve or reject proposed legislation. Its ﬁrst members
were appointed by the executive in anticipation of an electoral law that reduced the
representative element to a minimum.35
Between 1801 and 1815, the Dutch state again went through a series of
transformations. Displeased with its military and ﬁnancial contribution to the
revolutionary wars, Napoleon tightened his grip on the Batavian Republic and
ﬁrst installed, in 1805, the former Patriot Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck as the
head of state in a presidential system; a year later he made his brother Louis
Napoleon king of Holland. From 1810 to 1813 the Netherlands were incorporated
in the French Empire, until the defeat of the Napoleonic army led to the return to
power of the Orange family in the person of King William I, the son of the deposed
stadtholder, and the Congress of Vienna decided that the new Dutch restoration
monarchy was to merge with the territories of the former Austrian Netherlands.
In the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, sovereignty was believed to reside with
the monarch and not with the people; the members of the new bicameral parliament,
named after the old States-General, had a representative status only in the sense that
they were assumed to represent the interests of the people vis-a`-vis the king.
Every stage in this early nineteenth-century process of state formation (with the
exception of the years of incorporation) was accompanied by a new Dutch constitution,
but the formulation of the right to petition was modiﬁed to some extent only in the
constitution of 1801 and then preserved in 1805 and 1806.36 The ﬁrst constitution of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814), by contrast, did not mention the right at all.
This did not mean that it was not recognized by Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, the
new monarch’s minister whose constitutional draft was taken as a starting point
for discussion by a constitutional committee. As the chairman of this committee,
Van Hogendorp aﬃrmed that every citizen had the right to petition.37 Like most
committee members he believed that the right to petition was self-evident and therefore
did not need to be expressed in the constitution; this view was in part motivated by the
idea, as the former Batavian and Napoleonic administrator C.Th. Elout admitted
the following year in the constitutional committee that was to frame a constitution
for the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands, that drawing attention to the right in
the constitution would only attract petitioners and unnecessarily burden the national
parliament. When it became clear that most committee members from the Southern
Netherlands nevertheless wished to record the right to petition in the constitution, Elout
successfully proposed adopting the article from the ‘constitution of Louis Napoleon,’
which in reality originated in the 1801 Batavian constitution.38 The fact that the article
was deliberately tucked away in the chapter on the Provincial States did not prevent it
from becoming the subject of further debate on the nature and limits of the right to
petition over the course of the nineteenth century.
Who were Considered to have the Right to Petition?
If from the Dutch Republic to the United Kingdom most Dutch political actors
and opinion-makers agreed that petitioning was in principle a lawful instrument,
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this does not imply agreement about the question of who was eligible to make use
of this instrument. In the Dutch Republic the right to petition was understood to
belong to the body of customary law and little was written down about it.39 As a
consequence, there were few regulations that explicitly excluded speciﬁc (groups of)
citizens. Nevertheless, among the regents of the Republic, there was a common
understanding that the writing and presenting of petitions to political ends was not
equally appropriate for all.
In the middle of the eighteenth century this consensus was voiced by Jan
Wagenaar, a citizen of Amsterdam who is mostly known for his monumental
history of the Dutch people. Wagenaar was the anonymous author of a political
weekly that was published in 1747–1748 and commented on the political events
of those years. Following a French invasion in the Dutch Republic, the oﬃce of
stadtholder was reinstated after a stadtholderless period that had lasted, in most of
the provinces, for almost half a century. In the wake of the installation of William
IV of Orange a pro-stadtholder protest movement erupted against oligarchic city
governments in which regents aﬃliated with the anti-stadtholder States party still
exerted control.40 In the riotous atmosphere that ensued from the presenting of a
petition to the Amsterdam city council in November 1747, Wagenaar, a moderate
supporter of the States party, published an essay about petitioning in which he
included a list of rules that citizens should take into account before taking part in a
petition.41 These rules ‘codiﬁed’ the old regime regent consensus and became a
future point of reference.42
Wagenaar considered it beyond dispute that citizens had the right and the liberty
to present petitions for the purpose of making their grievances known or giving
advice to the government, but for a petition to be taken into consideration by the
authorities, at least some of the signatories would, in his view, have to be among
the most distinguished merchants of a given community. By contrast, he urged his
readers to steer clear of petitions that were signed only by incompetent and
common folk, as they had never seen from up close what governing entailed and
they were unfamiliar with the history of the country.43
During the Patriot Era, this distinction between eligible and ineligible citizens
resonated among both Patriots and Orangists, who routinely accused each other
of mobilizing the ignorant rabble for their petitions in exchange for money or alcohol
or under the threat of loss of their jobs or clientele.44 The States of Gelderland
justiﬁed their ban on political petitioning in 1786 by arguing that petitions presented
to them had been signed by children, deserving poor, servants and ‘some of the least
competent among our inhabitants’, while the issues that were raised in the petitions
required considerable knowledge of government aﬀairs, ‘the obtaining of which these
petitioners can have had neither the time nor the opportunity for’.45 In a similar vein,
a Patriot pamphlet from 1787 commented on the activity at an Orangist club, where
minors, women, and commoners who could neither read nor write and signed by
mark were induced to sign a petition by a drink or some pocket money.46
The counter-argument that could be made against such accusations was equally
employed by all parties. An Orangist periodical maintained that in a republic the
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wealth or status of petitioners was not relevant when it came to the ‘matter of
liberty’.47 The Patriot periodical De politieke snapper took the view that every
citizen, whether he was rich or poor, had the absolute right and even the moral
obligation to participate in petitions about matters of general interest.48 The latter
position was taken in the context of a conﬂict that had arisen in the city of Leiden
primarily between patrician Patriots who dominated the city council and Patriot
citizens united in a citizen militia in favor of more reforms. De politieke snapper
responded to an anonymous author who under the pseudonym E.L.I. (Een Leids
Ingezetene=An Inhabitant of Leiden) defended the step, taken by the council, of
conﬁscating a petition that had been available at the militia’s meetinghouse.49
E.L.I. stated that the petition bore the signatures of minors and outsiders as well
as uninformed and illiterate people.50 None of these groups met the criteria that a
citizen would have to meet in order to qualify as a petitioner: a personal interest in
the welfare of the society (possessing property of real estate or land); the independ-
ent position that was required to form a proper opinion (an appropriate age, no
relationship of dependency); and suﬃcient understanding of matters of govern-
ment. E.L.I. borrowed these criteria from a treatise that was published in the
same year by the young Patriot Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck. The latter had
introduced these criteria to determine which citizens should have the right to
vote in a system of representative government, but E.L.I. considered them equally
applicable with regard to the right to petition.51
The pamphlet of E.L.I. was part of an ongoing polemic with Pieter Vreede, who
served on the board of the Leiden Patriot militia.52 Vreede was also a member of
the editorial committee that drafted the ﬁnal version of the Leids Ontwerp, and
indeed the take on political petitioning in this manifesto was partly formulated in
response to E.L.I. With the Leiden city council in mind, it developed the argument
that under the present system of oligarchic government citizens could not be
excluded from the right to petition on the grounds that they lacked the capacity
to participate in this practice since the regents did themselves not govern by merit
of their capacities. The Leids Ontwerp did not, however, reject all restrictions
to participation in political petitioning altogether: if a system of representative
democracy was in place, veriﬁable criteria such as age, place of birth, citizenship
status and membership of a militia could be introduced; in practice this would
mean that the right to petition would be linked to the right to vote, for which
the same criteria were to apply.53 Here the Ontwerp betrays the inﬂuence of
Schimmelpenninck, one of the two other members of the committee responsible
for the draft.
When the representative system was introduced in the 1790s, the idea to link the
right to petition to the status of citizenship that deﬁned the right to vote was never
carried out; the 1798 constitution granted the right to ‘every inhabitant’ and not to
citizens alone. Their ideal of equality made the representative assemblies of the
Batavian Republic reluctant to propose or openly discuss criteria of eligibility,
though many of them held the view that inhabitants who openly supported the
previous regime should be excluded from all political rights. As far as the right to
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petition was concerned, members of the National Assembly did agree that children
did not have this right because they ‘had yet not learned to think as humans’ and
‘just followed the advice of their parents’, and one deputy proposed that the marks
of those who didn’t know how to read or write would have to be validated by two
witnesses.54 The assembly did occasionally accept and even grant an ‘honorable
mention’ to political petitions addressed to them by female petitioners, at least
implicitly extending the right to petition on matters of government also to
women.55
The Debate on Corporate and Collective Petitions
In 1784, 1215 Patriot citizens of Utrecht authorized, in the presence of a notary, 24
geconstitueerden or delegates to negotiate with the city council in their name; hence-
forth petitions that were signed by the delegates were to be understood as if they
bore 1215 signatures; in this way the Patriots intended to tackle the problem that
each petition was subject to the time-consuming and diﬃcult process of mobilizing
the Patriot supporters to come and sign it. The Utrecht city council recognized
the legality of this innovative construction and thus set a precedent for Patriots in
other cities.56
In Leiden, where a college of delegates represented more than 700 citizens, this
corporative form of political petitioning met with ﬁerce criticism from Orangists,
who suggested that the act of authorization contained the signatures of uninformed
citizens and outsiders.57 The Leiden city council was also uneasy about this way of
petitioning but like its Utrecht equivalent saw no way of outright forbidding it, as
the presenting of (private) petitions on behalf of corporative bodies had been a
long-established practice. Two months after the Leiden citizens had authorized
their delegates, the council decreed that any future petition signed by authorization
would have to be accompanied by signed statements in which each citizen who
granted authorization stated that it applied to that particular petition; signatures
would now again have to be gathered for every single petition, which was exactly
what the method of authorization had sought to avoid.58
Ten years later the debate on petitioning by corporation resurfaced during one
of the ﬁrst sessions of the National Assembly. The Batavian deputies could not
only draw on the example of their French counterparts who in May 1791 had
decreed the prohibition of collective petitions, but their discussions were certainly
also shaped by the experiences of the Patriot Era and of the ﬁrst year of the
Batavian Republic, in which the new representative bodies at the lower levels of
government had been bombarded with petitions drawn up in sharp language by the
leaders of radical Jacobin-style clubs.59 A majority of the assembly held the opinion
that with a system of representative democracy having replaced the oligarchic
government the presenting of petitions in the name of others should no longer
be tolerated because this practice enabled the political clubs to operate as some
sort of shadow government. This view was also motivated by a broader, French-
inspired rejection of corporatism. In the publication with which the National
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Assembly conﬁrmed the right to petition, it also stipulated that this right extended
to citizens and not to associations, which was to say that members of such asso-
ciations who presented a petition would all have to sign personally. The ﬁnal draft
of this publication was written by Jacob Hahn, a deputy from Leiden who during
the Patriot era had still been one of the geconstitueerden. Not all deputies had
evolved in the same way. Pieter Vreede, who had also been one of the delegates
in Leiden, upheld the right of corporations to present petitions because he claimed
that every restriction on the right to petition should be considered a restriction on
liberty itself.60
Vreede would come round only when he served as the oﬃcious leader of a
repressive regime that assumed power with a coup in January 1798, disgruntled
with the slow progress that had been made in adopting a constitution and turning
the confederacy into a unitary state. During a brief revolutionary intermezzo that
was ended by a moderate countercoup in June, Vreede and his fellow members of a
provisional executive government now received critical petitions from the network
of political clubs that had overwhelmingly supported their political agenda before
the coup. In the 1798 constitution that was a product of this regime, they
responded by stipulating that political associations were allowed only insofar as
they operated in support of the constitution and could not undertake any public
actions in their corporative capacity; the article on the right to petition speciﬁed
that ‘all petitioning is to happen personally and not collectively’.61
The administration that replaced the Vreede regime preserved the constitution
and instituted a constitutional order. In the Representative Body, the constitu-
tional successor to the National Assembly, not all deputies believed that the
constitution had adequately regulated the practice of petitioning. When in 1799
the parliament debated a series of petitions from citizens who complained about
various decrees, Cornelis van Foreest, a patrician Patriot from Alkmaar, made a
speech in which he denied that in a representative democracy a fraction of the
people had the right to question decisions taken by the people’s representatives
by way of petitions. Van Foreest argued that the representatives alone represented
the people at large. He also resurrected the classic argument that many of the
petitioners were ‘simple farmers who certainly have neither the time nor the ability
to critically scrutinize’ the acts of their governments.62 His intervention triggered a
great many angry responses. An overwhelming majority of the deputies was strongly
opposed to Van Foreest’s limited interpretation of the right to petition and criticized
his social elitism. Even those members who would later give their consent to the
dismantling of the democratic infrastructure of the Batavian Republic now reminded
Van Foreest of how their fellow Patriots had in 1794 been persecuted by
the Amsterdam government and how horriﬁed they had been by this injustice.63
Three years after the National Assembly had conﬁrmed the right to petition, the
consensus view remained that political petitioning was a sacred right.
In the text of the constitutional article from 1801 that was to determine the right
to petition during the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, the ambiguous clause
‘all petitioning is to happen personally and not collectively’ from the previous
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constitution was replaced with the clearer phrasing that petitions were to be ‘signed
personally and not in name of others’. This formulation once and for all shut the
door on such practices as those that had taken place during the Patriot Era but
kept alive the option of mass petitions with as many signatures as there were
petitioners. It would take more than a quarter of a century before this possibility
was explored. Towards the end of 1828 the Second Chamber (lower house) of the
bicameral Dutch parliament started to receive petitions signed by thousands of
citizens, mostly from the southern provinces of the United Kingdom of the
Netherlands.64 The petitioners expressed their grievances on a number of political
issues, such as the lack of press freedom and freedom of education. In February
and March 1829 the Second Chamber debated 150 of these petitions; the deputies
gave their views on their contents but also revitalized the discussion on the limits of
the right to petition. According to a periodical of the time, the lively deliberations
on this topic in the usually rather meek parliament captured the attention of the
general public.65
In the debate the constitution prevented any denial of the right to petition as
such, but some deputies demonstrated that old regime views on the extent of this
right were still widespread in the northern half of the restoration monarchy.
A deputy from Holland declared that the Belgian petitions were mostly signed
by people from the lowest class, who ‘can be incited to sign petitions the contents
of which are completely unknown to them’; a Frisian colleague reported that they
bore the signatures of girls, servants, and even of people who had illegally signed in
the name of others; and a member for Zeeland doubted whether the majority of the
signatories could really be trusted to assess matters of state in their entirety.66 All of
these deputies concluded that the petitions did not deserve the serious attention
of the parliament.
The deputy from Utrecht H.A.M.J. van Asch van Wijck argued that the right
to petition as stipulated in the constitution of 1815 was to be understood as an
individual right; van Asch van Wijck rejected petitions that bore a multitude of
signatures because if such petitions expressed dissenting opinions, this would turn
the system of representative government into a democracy, the worst of all types of
government.67 In the public debate to which the Belgian petitioning campaign gave
rise van Asch van Wijck’s position was shared by an anonymous author who
claimed that the clause ‘personally and not in name of others’ could not possibly
mean anything other than that mass petitioning was prohibited, as the makers of
the constitution would never have inserted an article that endangered order and
stability in society.68 This view was ridiculed by the young jurist Cornelis Star
Numan, a commentator from the Northern Netherlands who aﬃrmed the lawful-
ness of the Belgian mass petitions even if he did not agree with their contents.
Star Numan called it incomprehensible that ‘personally and not in name of others’
appeared to be open to the interpretation that petitions with multiple signatures
were forbidden. Clearly unimpressed by the tendency of most of his older contem-
poraries to disavow the revolutionary roots of much of the restoration monarchy’s
organic legislation, he correctly pointed out that in 1801 this phrase had been
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chosen precisely because the 1798 constitution had caused confusion in this
respect.69 This made him perhaps the only early-nineteenth-century participant
in the debate on petitioning who, instead of tacitly using arguments that preceded
the founding of the Kingdom, publicly acknowledged that this was a much
older debate.
What Did the Right to Petition Amount To?
To most participants in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debate on petition-
ing, the right of citizens to petition was mirrored by a right of authorities to dispose
of petitions as they saw ﬁt. As Jan Wagenaar put it in 1748, denying the authorities
this right was the same as saying that they no longer were authorities.70 During the
Patriot Era most commentators agreed that the very word request implied by
deﬁnition that petitioners had no right whatsoever to expect that their petitions
would be granted; while supporters of the oligarchic system considered the freedom
to take autonomous decisions part of the sovereignty of the regents, Patriots who
believed that sovereignty resided with the people wanted to delegate the exercise of
this sovereignty to representatives who would likewise be at liberty to take their
own decisions.71 Even those Patriots who claimed that petitions should be bold
demands rather than humble requests regarded this as a temporary solution until
the oligarchic regime had been replaced. When in the next decade a representative
system was put in place, the dominant opinion among the Batavians remained that
the elected representatives could freely turn down petitions as they had much more
opportunity than petitioners to see the aﬀairs of the country in their entirety.72
Yet, for all the belief that those in power were under no obligation to do what
petitioners requested of them, there also remained a sense that if petitioners
represented what was called ‘the voice of the people’ (eighteenth century) or ‘the
public opinion’ (nineteenth century) their grievances or desires could not lightly be
ignored. Petitioners obviously had this idea in mind when they gathered as
many signatures as possible for their petitions, but those who were opposed to
the contents of a petition reasoned from the same idea when they argued that the
authorities should ignore it because the number of signatories represented only a
fraction of the population of a city, a province or the country.73 Others followed an
opposite line of reasoning and disapproved of petitions with many signatures
exactly because they might give authorities the feeling that they had no choice
but to grant them.74
In the ﬁrst year of the Batavian Republic an anonymous correspondent of De
Republikein suggested that the new authorities introduce legislation to establish
whether a petition represented the voice of the people. If a governmental body
received a petition, it should make available a petition that voiced the opposite
position, and by counting the number of signatures each petition obtained it would
be possible to determine what the people wanted.75 Conceived in this way the
practice of petitioning approached that of the referendum, and indeed throughout
the ﬁrst years of the Batavian Republic referenda were organized by all levels of
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government, including ones that were binding, such as two plebiscites in 1797 and
1798 in which the Batavian people were asked to decide about constitutional drafts.
Prior to the coup of 1798, 43 radical deputies published a political manifesto in
which they demanded, among other things, that if the petitions about an issue
exceeded a certain number, the representative assembly would be obliged to call
a binding referendum.76 Giving such a status to petitions was considered several
bridges too far by the majority of the representatives: as one of them put it, even if
the number of petitioners were to rise to hundreds of thousands, he would continue
to form his own opinion ‘because he who . . . approves of something because the
crowd wants him to, is the most dangerous creature that can be imagined in a
popular government’.77
The number he mentioned was hardly hyperbolic. The Batavian Era witnessed
mass petitioning campaigns that are among the largest in Dutch history, but none
was bigger in scale than the campaign that unfolded under the auspices of
the Dutch Reformed Church. In October 1797 the National Assembly started
to receive petitions with long lists of signatures, totaling an estimated 215,000,
10 percent of the Dutch population.78 The petitioners warned that if the assembly
were to follow through on its intention to abolish the privileged status of the
Reformed Church in the draft constitution it was to produce, they would reject
this draft in the upcoming referendum. For the members of the National Assembly
it was extremely awkward that the objective of this massive petition drive was
plainly at odds with one of the foundational ideals of the Batavian Republic, the
equality between members of the diﬀerent churches. The assembly ﬁrst decided to
forward the petitions to its constitutional committee, but when one of the deputies
disclosed that the members of this committee had locked earlier petitions of a
similar nature away in a large box without paying the slightest attention to them
– the petitions, claimed another deputy in defense, had been signed by many
women, children, fools, and even in the name of unborn babies – it embarrassedly
ruled any future petitions on the matter out of order on the ground that they
anticipated the constitution.79
Ruling out of order was one of the possible decrees the National Assembly and
its constitutional successors could issue in response to the many petitions they were
confronted with.80 They could also dismiss a petition or take note of it, with or
without honorable mention for the petitioners. All of these options ultimately came
down to taking no action, but this did not stop the representative assemblies of the
Batavian Republic from endlessly debating which decree was most appropriate.81
It is tempting to discard these discussions as quibbles over nothing, but they
actually point to the fact that acknowledgement of the grievance or desire voiced
in a petition was in itself seen as a form of granting it, at least by the authorities.
Three decades later an advice by the principal advisory body of the government on
the occasion of the Belgian petition campaign demonstrated that this way of think-
ing had not withered; the Council of State declared that the lower house of the
parliament had the duty to ‘get petitions out of the way’ by proceeding to the
order of the day or by resorting to the ‘no less honorable measure of making
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them available at the clerk’s oﬃce’ (my italics).82 The latter action implied that the
deputies could review the petitions when they wanted to make use of their right
of initiative, but in the tame political climate of the restoration monarchy this
possibility was strictly theoretical.83
Whatever the view of the authorities about the instrument of petitioning, its
users did not delude themselves about its eﬀectiveness. Contemporary Dutch
speakers used expressions that alluded to the practice of petitioning in a less
than ﬂattering way: in the Dutch Republic saying that something was ‘hanging
on a spike’ (like petitions in government and court buildings) meant that no action
was taken; this led one satirical commentator in 1796 to propose the creation of a
Committee of Spikes or Hanging that was to hang all petitions that had been left
unanswered in the Batavian Republic on spikes, in neat alphabetical order.84 In the
Kingdom the expression ‘to make something available at the clerk’s oﬃce’ was
mockingly used instead of saying that something would never be heard of again.85
Not all petitions suﬀered a similar fate. Besides various actions that amounted
to taking no action, the National Assembly of the Batavian Republic could decide
to assign a parliamentary commission or one of the committees that made up the
executive power the task of inspecting the contents of a petition and producing
an advice, the plenary debate about which regularly resulted in new legislation.
This procedure remained essentially intact after the introduction of the 1798 con-
stitution, which replaced the committees with an executive government modeled
after the French Directory and supported by ministries, but conﬁrmed the supreme
power of the legislature. At least one contributor to the debate leading up to the
constitution of 1801 proposed that the legislative power should be excluded from
receiving petitions because the discussion of petitions belonged not to the making
but to the execution of legislation, and was as such the exclusive competence of the
executive power.86 This view was not adopted by the makers of the constitution,
but foreshadowed the focus of the debate in the decades to come.
During the discussions of the committee that was to produce the constitution of
1815, C.F. van Maanen, a veteran administrator of the Batavian-French era, denied
that citizens should have the right to petition parliament about matters that involved
executive power on the ground that in a constitutional monarchy the legislature could
not call the executive to account, so the parliament would not know what to do with
such petitions.87 The matter was left undecided when the article from the 1801 con-
stitution was adopted, but during one of the ﬁrst sessions of the lower house of the
parliament its chairman J.E.N. van Lynden van Hoevelaken, who in the constitutional
committee had supported the position of Van Maanen (and, in the background, that
of the king), instituted a commission that was to investigate the matter. When this
commission and with it the majority of the Second Chamber asserted its own right not
only to receive petitions but also to forward them to the competent ministries, the king
reacted in 1820 with a royal edict that ordered the ministers to abstain from receiving
anything but laws from the parliament.88
In the parliamentary debate following the Belgian petition campaign of 1828–1829,
the fact that this edict had eﬀectively made it impossible for the Second Chamber to
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respond to petitions in any meaningful way became one of the principal points of
controversy. Whereas the deputies from the southern provinces merely pointed
out that the grievances expressed by the petitioners were legitimate and most
northern members wondered why the petitioners did not address the king dir-
ectly, a small group of members from the north defended a more principled
position. The most compelling argument was made by Lodewijk Caspar Luzac,
a deputy for whom being at the forefront of the debate about petitioning ran in
the family: his uncle Johan Luzac had been one of the organizers of the petition
requesting the recognition of John Adams as US envoy, the ﬁrst political mass
petition of the Patriot era, while Elie Luzac, the foremost interpreter of the
Orangist perspective in this debate during the 1780s, was a distant cousin.89
Luzac brought to the attention of his fellow deputies that since the royal edict of
1820, the Second Chamber had responded to petitions only by returning to the
order of the day or if the petition was recognized to contain legitimate complaints,
by making it available at the clerk’s oﬃce. According to Luzac, these responses
did not satisfy the ‘wise part of the nation’. He considered the parliament an
intermediary power between people and king, and saw it as its responsibility to
make sure that the right to petition was more than the ‘pathetic permission to ﬁll
some pages of stamped paper with complaints and see these being made available
at the clerk’s oﬃce, from where they will never depart again’.90
Luzac’s proposal to request the government to revoke the edict of 1820 attracted
little support. Instead, the Kamer decreed that the contents of the petitions were to
be brought to the attention of the king via the constitutional instrument of a formal
address, but this was blocked by a veto of the senate. The king in turn issued, in
January 1830, a new royal edict in which the interdiction of the accepting by min-
isters of petitions forwarded by the Second Chamber was renewed.91 When the
Second Chamber received in the following months a new wave of petitions, this
time with several hundreds of thousands of signatures, the most notable response
came from W.B. Donker Curtius van Tienhoven, a deputy from Holland, who used
an abundance of familiar arguments to convince his colleagues that the Belgian
petitioners had abused the right to petition: their petitions did not express desires
but demands and the large number of signatures was intended to press these
demands; most of the petitioners did not understand where their true interests
lay and had been misled by their leaders; men had been pushed to sign by
women, workers by their masters. Donker Curtius proposed the introduction of
a number of restrictive measures, such as the requirement, applicable in Great
Britain, that every petition was to be presented through a member of parliament.92
The Dutch lower house considered the matter ‘too delicate’ for the present times
and ended the debate by resorting to the usual routine of making the petitions
available at the clerk’s oﬃce.93 Later that year, the incentive for a more principled
discussion about the limits of the right to petition faded when a revolt in the south-
ern provinces de facto resulted in an independent Belgian state. In the remaining
Dutch rump state there was little urge to use the petition as a political instrument,
for a couple of decades at least.
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Conclusion
In the political history of the Netherlands the period between 1750 and 1830 is seen
as an age of great ideological and institutional transformations. From the Dutch
Republic to the (rump) Kingdom of the Netherlands, however, petitions remained
the principal instrument for citizens to address their authorities; the debate on these
citizens’ right to petition shows considerable continuity. To most participants in
this debate, the right to petition was twofold and included the right to make requests
both about matters of interest to speciﬁc private individuals and groups and about
matters that concerned the general interest of the local, provincial or national com-
munity. The distinction between these two categories was implicitly codiﬁed in the
1801 constitution – where the right to petition was given the era’s most authoritative
formulation – that neither used the older word request nor the newer petitie but
instead spoke of verzoeken (requests) and voordrachten (proposals), which can be
read as (the right to) private and political petitions respectively.
The right to present petitions of the second category was rarely downright
rejected. Authorities that restricted or banned political petitioning did not do so
on principled grounds but argued that this right had been abused. Commentators
loyal to the political establishment did certainly not unequivocally welcome the
instrument of political petitioning; whereas some merely cautioned that rare and
prudent use was to be made of it, others ascribed to the regents a superior capacity
of judgment in all matters political and consequently saw no use for the political
petition; very few, however, went so far as to categorically deny this right to all.
The view that political petitioning was not for everybody proved persistent
throughout the period under discussion. Participation in petitioning by those
who were underage and by foreigners was considered illegal, or at best inappro-
priate, during the entire period, and so was, with a few ad hoc exceptions in the
time of the Batavian Republic, petitioning by women. Almost as resilient was
the belief in the ineligibility of another category of inhabitants, variously referred
to as uninformed, incompetent, dependent, corruptible, or gullible; they were not
outright denied the right to petition, but the standard argument ran that their
involvement in a petition was an obvious reason for authorities to turn it down
because they lacked the opportunity to form a sound opinion. If the Batavian years
witnessed the construction of a taboo on explicitly advocating the exclusion of
members of society belonging to the lower classes, this did not mean that the
ideas nurturing this reﬂex also disappeared, and in the restoration monarchy the
argument made a comeback.
The most notable change in the attitude towards the right to petition took place
with regard to collective petitioning. Whereas the Patriot Era had brought forth the
innovative practice of citizens supplying delegates with indeﬁnite authorizations
to present political petitions in their name, the Batavians shut the door on such
corporative forms of political petitioning and established that each petitioner was
to sign personally in order to count. While this principle would never again be
called into question, attempts to rule out all collective petitioning by proposing that
no petition could be signed by more than one petitioner proved unsuccessful.
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Throughout the period under discussion, the dominant view remained that the
right to present political petitions was essentially a right to provide authorities with
advice as to how to address widely felt grievances or advance the general interest.
There was a general consensus that petitioners should show proper respect for their
lawful governments and that they had no right to expect their petition to be
granted. Only during the 1780s did some Patriot theorists maintain that citizens
could employ the political petition to pressure authorities into certain decisions.
They framed this, however, as an exceptional use of the instrument that was
legitimate only as long as citizens did not have the right to choose their own
representatives; once representative democracy was introduced, the sovereignty
of the people was to be exercised through a system of elections and representation,
and the petition would regain its original function of political thermometer.
And indeed, in the Batavian Republic and beyond, the majority of the represen-
tatives held that petitions always represented the view of only a fraction of the
people, and that they, who represented the entire local, provincial or national
community, were therefore under no obligation to do as the petitioners requested.
If this analysis of the debate about the right to petition has discussed to which
extent attempts to inﬂuence the political process through the instrument of
petitioning were deemed appropriate and to what degree authorities saw petitions
as interventions that were to be taken seriously, it tells us little about the actual
eﬀectiveness of political petitions. Considering the vigor with which theorists
throughout the period under discussion continued to stress the right of authorities
to turn down petitions, this eﬀectiveness may seem to be slight, but one might just
as well conclude that the perceived need to continuously emphasize this point
reﬂected a deeper belief – in some cases anxiety – that petitions could not be
disregarded if they expressed legitimate concerns; it is perhaps not unreasonable
to assume that this belief was also present among the ruling classes of patrician
regents and democratic representatives in the time of the Republic. In the
Kingdom, where every notion of popular sovereignty was rejected, representatives
believed they answered to the king rather than to the people and could therefore
put petitions aside with fewer scruples. Under the restoration monarchy, as under
previous regimes, however, political petitions not only served the purpose of
attempting to obtain a direct positive response on the part of the government,
by resorting to the force of numbers, the petitioners also intended to make the
conclusion inescapable that, as much as the authorities had every right to ignore
them, they could not possibly do this without serious consequences.
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